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EMPIRICISM AND WESLEYAN ETHICS
by

Kevin Twain Lowery1

The term “Wesleyan ethics” is somewhat nebulous for several reasons. First, Wesley never systematized his own views on ethics. In fact,
Wesley was seemingly not very concerned with systematizing his thought
in general. Of course, he did maintain particular theological and intellectual commitments throughout his life, and these formed the backbone of
his thought. Nevertheless, he did not focus on producing a systematic theology or a system of ethics. This permits any field classified as “Wesleyan”
a significant amount of latitude in the ways that it interprets and develops
Wesley’s thought. This breadth is even greater when we consider Wesley’s
eclecticism, for he rather freely appropriated concepts from a wide variety
of sources.
Consequently, Wesleyan ethics is a relatively open field. Attempts to
articulate a system of Wesleyan ethics have been few, and given the parameters already mentioned, it would be virtually impossible for any one
expression of Wesleyan ethics to be regarded as definitive for the tradition
as a whole. As a result, it is not uncommon for Wesleyans to generate a
rather broad spectrum of positions on any given ethical issue. Indeed, this
pattern is evident within United Methodism, and the spectrum is wider still
when we consider the broader family of Christian traditions that all trace
their lineage through Wesley. Some may find this lack of definition disconcerting, but I believe that it allows sufficient latitude for the tradition to

1I express my appreciation to Craig Boyd, Eric Manchester, Tom Oord, and
Bryan Williams for their affirmation and helpful comments on this paper.
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develop and to adapt to any cultural setting, thus ensuring its potential relevance in the long run. All of this is, of course, dependent upon constructive dialog between a plurality of Wesleyan voices.
This is not to suggest that any and every ethical stance and methodology can be regarded as Wesleyan, for there are distinctive theological
and intellectual commitments that define what it means for ethics to be
Wesleyan. For example, Wesley’s emphasis on the centrality of the Love
Commandments and his concern with the perfection of the individual
make it necessary for any account of Wesleyan ethics to give due consideration to Christian virtues and the ways that they are inculcated, fostered,
and expressed within the lives of individual believers. It thus seems that
virtue ethics should be a central part of Wesleyan ethics, regardless of how
it is articulated otherwise.
A number of eighteenth-century moral theorists, especially those
within the British empiricist tradition, asserted that the ethicality of actions
lies primarily in the motives behind them and not so much in the effects
they produce. Wesley clearly followed this trend as is reflected in his definitions of sin and perfection. He believed that sin is a matter of intention,
and he understood perfection to entail the refinement of motives.2 Aside
from some occasional casuistry, Wesley did not give significant attention
to the systematic evaluation of the practical effects of actions. This is precisely the place where Wesleyan ethics must be bolstered, for it is not
enough to say that all of our actions must be motivated by love for God
and love for neighbor. We need to be able to determine what the most loving action would be in a particular situation. In essence, virtue ethics cannot truly stand on its own, for it requires an account of the good. Just as
Aristotle’s virtue ethics is supported by utilitarianism and Aquinas’s virtue
ethics is supported by natural law theory, so is Wesleyan ethics in need of
a support system for it’s account of virtue.
In my opinion, there are a number of approaches that can be taken,
and yet only those that remain consistent with Wesley’s principal intellectual commitments should be regarded as Wesleyan in the fullest sense of
the word. This is what distinguishes mere appropriations of thought from

2Wesley to Elizabeth Bennis, 16 June 1772, The Works of John Wesley, edited by Thomas Jackson (London: Wesleyan Methodist Book Room, 1872), 12:394;
Wesley, “A Plain Account of Christian Perfection,” §3, Works [Jackson ed.],
11:367; Kevin Twain Lowery, Salvaging Wesley’s Agenda: A New Paradigm for
Wesleyan Virtue Ethics (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock), 287-93.
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the intellectual development of that thought. Wesley has several commitments that should be taken into consideration, but I would like to focus on
the Wesleyan epistemic commitment to empiricism. Wesley’s identity as
an empiricist and the influence of Aristotle and Locke on him are well documented and generally accepted, so it will not be necessary to repeat any
of that material here.3 Rather, my specific purpose will be to briefly outline the ways that empiricism potentially impacts Wesleyan ethics.
I must admit that my own reasons for embracing empiricism have little to do with Wesley. I would be an empiricist even if I believed that
Wesley was a Quietist. The fact that Wesley was an empiricist is a significant part of his appeal to me. His commitment to empiricism may not have
been as strong as mine, but much of that is just the difference in intellectual climate between the eighteenth and twenty-first centuries. Wesley may
not have been preoccupied with epistemological questions, but he gave
them a fair amount of attention for a clergyman of his day. In this postmodern era, it is even more important that we give them due consideration,
especially since epistemology is foundational to our perceptions and
beliefs. I thus will briefly outline some basic ways that Wesleyan ethics is
impacted by a commitment to empiricism. In order to do this, I first will
need to discuss what it means for ethics to be understood from an empirical perspective.
Moral Discernment as Empirical

Obviously, empiricism is the view that all of our beliefs are rooted in
sensory perception. Some people embrace empiricism more generally, but
they consider ethics to be a special case. This was indeed part of the debate
among eighteenth-century British ethicists, as a number of them described
conscience as a “moral sense.” The question concerns the extent to which
moral judgment can be understood as the perception of an objective reality. Locke had noted, in a more general sense, that our minds form ideas
from the objects we perceive, and the ideas are distinct from the objects
from which they originate.4 For example, when I look at a tree, I form my
own idea of that tree from my perception of it. On one hand, I can regard
my idea of the tree to be objective, because it is formed from the percep3See Lowery, 65-121.
4John Locke, Essay Concerning

Human Understanding, collated and annotated by Alexander Campbell Fraser, §2.1 (New York: Dover, 1959), 1:121-43.
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tion of a real object. On the other hand, there is still some subjectivity in
my idea of the tree since I can only perceive it from a particular perspective. This is akin to Kant’s distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal, and epistemological discussions that occurred several decades
earlier anticipated this distinction.
The British empiricists were willing to trust their perceptions of
material objects, but they were more skeptical about moral discernment.
They wanted to regard moral judgment as a type of perception, i.e. they
wanted to believe that, when we judge something to be right or wrong, we
are perceiving some kind of objective property or characteristic. This
would make morality objective and ultimately binding on everyone.
Nevertheless, many of the British empiricists were willing to acknowledge
that moral perception is much more subjective than the perception of physical objects. This is precisely what Kant refused to accept, and he reacted
strongly against it by taking an opposing stance. He asserted that moral
discernment is not empirical at all but is equally accessible and obvious to
all persons.5 Whereas he tried to make ethics universal by making it transcendental, the empiricists started to view ethics as more relative, albeit
still rooted in some kind of objective reality that can be perceived, whether
that be natural law or human nature.
All of this discussion helps us to identify some ways that Wesleyan
ethics (and ethics in general) is shaped by an empirical perspective. First,
moral knowledge is not learned through mandated or intuited absolutes.
Rather, moral knowledge is derived from empirical sources. Wesley’s doctrine of prevenient grace ascribes some degree of conscience to every
human being, giving us both the responsibility and the freedom of moral
deliberation.6 This is in stark contrast to those who stress human depravity to the point of being skeptical about the natural function of conscience,
a skepticism that often leads to legalism and biblical literalism. By assuming that we cannot naturally discern good and evil, they conclude that we
must be told what is good and what is evil.
5Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and Other
Writings, ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998), 112-5 [German (originally the Royal Prussian) Academy
of Sciences edition, Kants gesammelte Schriften, 6:102-6].
6Wesley, Sermon 105, “On Conscience,” The Works of John Wesley
(Nashville: Abingdon, 1988), 1:479-90 [Jackson ed., 7:186-94]. Also, see Lowery,
224-8.
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Such should not be characteristic of Wesleyan ethics, at least from an
empirical perspective. Moral judgment should be recognized as being
empirically grounded. Consequently, it is affected by situation and perspective. Although ethics is rooted in human nature, the nature of social
relationships, and the structure of the world, our discernment of ethics, like
all of our judgment in general, depends upon the particular experiences we
have had. We must judge based upon the data that is available to us. That
is why education is so important, for it allows us to vastly expand the database of information on which we base our judgments. Wesley, Locke, and
other empiricists all stressed the importance of education, including the
inculcation of morals.7 Indeed, it is foolish to base one’s judgment solely
upon one’s own experiences, because wisdom is gained through perspective and understanding. This holds true for belief in general, and it is true
for moral reasoning as well. Moral judgment is best made by integrating
as many sources as possible. Therefore, a Wesleyan commitment to
empiricism should lead to the rejection of the notion of sola Scriptura, for
even the understanding and interpretation of Scripture are affected by perspective. Biblical hermeneutics cannot and should not take place in a vacuum. Instead, it should be informed by information that is gathered and
integrated from a wide variety of sources. This approach is reflected in
Wesley’s own eclecticism.
In addition, ethics from an empirical perspective encourages the scientific study of moral reasoning. After all, science is essentially our best
efforts to understand the world and ourselves based upon the empirical
observations we are able to make. To say that reasoning itself can be studied scientifically is to recognize our ability to think recursively, i.e., to
think about the process of thinking. When Wesleyan ethics is grounded
empirically, it can be informed by the natural and social sciences. Current
studies in fields like genetics and cognitive science hold great promise for
unlocking more mysteries for us, and ethics should take them into account.
Of course, we have not even considered what is perhaps the greatest
challenge to empirically based ethics, namely, the question of the naturalistic fallacy, and there are many who claim that we cannot derive “what
ought to be” from “what is.” It is obviously beyond the scope of this essay
7Locke, §§1.2.2-8, 1:66-72; §§1.2.22-5, 1:87-9; Wesley, Sermon 69, “The
Imperfection of Human Knowledge,” §3.1, Works, 2:582–3 [Jackson ed.,
6:347–8]. Also, see Lowery, 114-21.

— 154 —

E MPIRICISM

AND

W ESLEYAN E THICS

to give a fully adequate response to this objection. Nevertheless, I will
briefly make a few points that I consider salient. First, although empiricism does not require one to reject the notion that there are moral
absolutes, it does require one to admit that the certainty of our beliefs can
never be absolute. All of our beliefs are formed from a particular perspective and have some degree of subjectivity. Consequently, even if there are
moral absolutes, we can never be completely certain that we know what
those absolutes are. Even if we merely aspire to approximate the ideals we
hold, we can never be absolutely sure that we know precisely what the
ideals should be. Instead, any ideals we hold are simply projected outward
and extrapolated from the values we hold. In the final analysis, the existence of moral absolutes is ultimately a moot question.
Does this eliminate or undermine ethics? Not in the least. It only
requires the empiricist to see ethics teleologically, at least in the sense that
we should strive to constantly improve, refine, and, if necessary, correct
our moral reasoning. This is what empiricism requires of our beliefs in
general. At any given point in time our reasoning is dependent upon the
data that is supplied to it. Strictly speaking, we are unable to see things
from the standpoint of “all things considered,” so we live within the
parameters of “this much considered.” We can only try to extrapolate from
the data that we have in order to predict possible outcomes for a particular
course of action. This is the best that we can do, and so our reasoning
(especially our moral reasoning) always has a certain degree of speculation
and must therefore be corrected over time as we acquire more data. This is
how knowledge proceeds as a general rule.
Ethics is concerned with higher-level questions of value, so it should
guide the way other academic disciplines are conducted and utilized.
However, ethics is more speculative than most disciplines because it is further removed from direct empirical observation. Ethics is based upon
empirical observations, but the conclusions it reaches require a lot of interpretation, and this is where it becomes more speculative. Consequently, it
needs to be informed by the other disciplines, especially those most directly derived from empirical observation, i.e., those requiring the least
amount of interpretation. In this way, the progress of ethics as a discipline
is similar to that of philosophy and theology, because all of them focus on
higher, broader questions of value, meaning, and purpose. They address
the questions that are the most important overall, but since they are further
removed from direct empirical observation, they are more speculative and
allow much more room for disagreement.
— 155 —
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These characteristics of ethics help us to see the limitations within
which it is able to progress. As a discipline centered on higher, broader levels of interpretation, ethics works with data that is highly complex, especially the complexities of human behavior. As a result, ethics does not benefit from feedback as quickly as other disciplines of knowledge. Yes, there
is nothing to prevent conclusions from being formed after just a small
number of observations, but these conclusions are tentative and subject to
revision. We are generally aware of this limitation. It is the very reason we
disdain stereotyping and prejudice and regard them as unfair.
The complexities of ethical scenarios are also problematic in the
sense that the context of moral reasoning is always changing. The empirical sciences test their theories by controlling variables in order to repeatedly re-create the same experimental conditions. Ethical scenarios cannot
be controlled and repeated in the same way. Even if they could, considering to do so would itself pose an ethical problem because this would push
the use of experimental subjects much further than what are now considered to be acceptable limits. For example, would we really want to test the
ethicality of marital fidelity by having subjects engage in adulterous
behavior? Of course not. Since much moral reasoning takes place in the
abstract, its usefulness is limited until the occurrence of real-life scenarios
allow for its testing. Even then, each scenario is somewhat unique, so
moral reasoning quite often cannot be tested directly through particular
experiences. Instead, we must learn over time by analyzing the similarities
and differences between individual scenarios.
This brings us back to the heart of the supposed naturalistic fallacy.
Can we determine what ought to be from the empirical observations we are
able to make? On one hand, we cannot achieve absolute moral certainty,
no matter how many observations we make, because there are always possible exceptions to every law, goal, and virtue. On the other hand, we are
able to achieve a sufficiently high degree of moral certainty from patterns
that we are able to observe over time, and this certainty can be strengthened as more observations are made. When understood in this way, it
seems that the naturalistic fallacy objection made famous by Hume and
Moore is actually a variant of the problem of induction that Hume articulated so well. For example, Hume pointed out that even though we cannot
know with absolute certainty that the sun will rise again tomorrow, it is
reasonable to infer that it will, because the fact that it has for many, many
years makes the probability of tomorrow’s sunrise extremely high.
— 156 —
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Consequently, it would be foolish to allow any possible doubt of tomorrow’s sunrise to affect one’s behavior.8 Along the same lines, even if we
can never attain absolute moral certainty, we are able to attain sufficient
moral certainty so as to guide our behavior. As we learn more over time,
we are able to adjust our mores accordingly. To illustrate, even though
women and racial groups have been oppressed for many centuries, it
became evident enough that this oppression lacks justification, and so people began changing their mores in that regard.
No doubt some will object to the way I am construing ethics because
it makes ethics consequentialist to a great extent. They will say that the end
does not justify the means. My response is that this assertion rests on a
semantic ambiguity. To be sure, the desirability of an end does not justify
every possible means of attaining that end, and so, in that sense, it is true
that the end does not justify the means. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that
the results that are produced by a particular course of action determine the
extent to which the course of action is or is not justified. I believe this in a
normative sense, and I believe that this is the way moral reasoning actually takes place, regardless of how we attempt to justify it, theoretically or
otherwise. What disqualifies a particular means to a desirable end are the
side effects that either are produced or are likely to be produced. Whenever
we care more about avoiding the undesirable side effects than we do about
attaining the desired end, we will deem that particular means unjustified.
A well-known example from history will help to illustrate this.
Toward the end of his life, Kant’s universal understanding of ethics was
criticized by a younger contemporary in an article he published. He posed
the question whether it would be moral to lie in order to save someone’s
life. In the scenario he offered, a man fleeing from a killer seeks refuge in
a home, and the killer shows up looking for him. The article suggests that
lying would be the moral action in that particular circumstance, contradicting Kant’s view that we should always act on universalizable maxims.
Rather than concede this apparent flaw in his theory, Kant’s rejoinder was
that telling the truth would still be the moral thing to do. Ironically, Kant
was not satisfied to simply argue that ethics is always universal. On the
contrary, he weakly suggested that one should still tell the truth since the
man may have secretly fled from the house another way, and lying may in

8David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, §4.1
(Indianapolis, Hackett, 1993), 15-19.
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fact help the killer to find him outside. Perhaps realizing how silly this
response seemed, he then asserted that the harm caused by creating a slippery slope for the justification of lying is worse than the harm of losing an
individual life.9 Whether or not Kant realized it, he ended up justifying his
position with an empirical observation.
In a similar manner, many a consequentialist has shown how moral
dilemmas, no matter how rarely they might actually occur in real life, force
us to seriously consider making exceptions to the laws, goals, and virtues
that we use to describe ethics, and these considerations are based on empirical observations and value judgments. In the final analysis, the situations
we face in real life have many similarities, and this enables us to simplify
moral reasoning by generalizing ethics in some theoretical way. Nevertheless, our moral reasoning is still ultimately based on the possible outcomes that we see for particular courses of action. Even though moral
dilemmas of the type offered by consequentialists are so rare that they do
not seriously cause us to abandon the theoretical ways we construe moral
reasoning, we do gradually adjust our moral theories and our value systems based on the empirical observations we make over time.
Wesleyan Ethics as Empirical

Allow me to briefly restate my general argument. I began by noting
how Wesleyan ethics is rather open-ended, and this allows it to be developed in a number of ways that can still be regarded as Wesleyan or are at
least consistent with basic Wesleyan commitments. We then recalled
Wesley’s allegiance to empiricism, and I stressed the importance of
addressing epistemological questions. Next, I attempted to outline what it
means for ethics to be grounded in empiricism, and I offered a simple justification for viewing ethics that way. In this final section it only remains
to point out the various options that exist for developing Wesleyan ethics
within an empiricist framework.
There are several options that can be eliminated from the outset. To
start, empiricism moves Wesleyan ethics away from Divine command
ethics. The Wesleyan doctrine of prevenient grace acknowledges the role
of conscience, even more so when bolstered by a commitment to empiri-

9Immanuel Kant, “On a Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic
Concerns,” published with Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 63-7 [8:425-30].
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cism. Moreover, Wesleyan ethics places great emphasis on moral motive,
and this stresses the need for motive to originate in one’s own reasoning.
It is good to freely choose to obey what one is commanded to do, but it is
even better to choose the action without having to be commanded to do it.
For example, it is good for children to clean their rooms whenever their
parents ask them to do so, but it is even better if they clean their rooms
without needing to be told to do it. Divine command ethics is thus at odds
with the Wesleyan view of moral perfection, in which the individual learns
to love as Christ loves and to think as Christ thinks.10 It is a more synergistic view of grace, one that places both the freedom and the responsibility of moral deliberation on our shoulders. Whereas Divine command
ethics quite often tends toward biblical literalism, Wesleyan ethics is best
served by a more flexible hermeneutic, one that is comfortable with interpreting some scriptural passages either contextually or allegorically.
The next option to be eliminated is Kantian ethics. This choice is
rather obvious because Kantian ethics is diametrically opposed to ethics
that is empirically grounded. Kant believed that empirically grounded
value judgments are ultimately reducible to self-interest, and he felt that
ethics must transcend self-interest.11 Wesleyan ethics comes from the very
British empiricist tradition that Kant was opposing. From the standpoint of
empiricism, Kantian ethics is self-deluding because we cannot neatly separate our feelings from our reasoning. This is what the pragmatists stressed
a century after Kant. Rather than try to deny personal feelings, Wesleyan
ethics focuses on the moral perfection of motives, because motive and
intention are at the core of ethics. Ethics is not merely a rationalistic exercise. Instead, it starts with proper love for God, others, and self. In recognizing our epistemic limits, the empiricist realizes that ethics is not a set of
inflexible rules. Rather, moral reasoning is always contextual, connecting
the particular perspective of the moral agent with the specific situation at
hand.
Wesleyan ethics should also avoid moral intuitionism, whether it be
mystical or otherwise. Ethics requires deliberation, and this is part of our
moral duty. Consequently, we must accept responsibility for our moral rea-

10Albert Outler made a similar point about the incompatibility of divine
command ethics and the pursuit of Christian perfection. See Albert C. Outler,
Theology in the Wesleyan Spirit (Nashville: Tidings, 1975), 81.
11Kant, Grounding, §2, 45-8 [4:441-4].
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soning and for the consequences of our actions. The empiricist realizes that
moral education is important, because reasoning is most reliable when it is
able to integrate much information from a wide array of perspectives. It is
just as important to learn from the experiences of others as it is to learn from
our own successes and failures. Of all the possible approaches to Wesleyan
ethics, I believe that there are three that offer the most promise. All of these
are fruitful options for empirical ethics, for they were utilized in this way
by two of history’s most notable philosophers: Aristotle and Aquinas.

1. Natural law theory. First, empirically based ethics can be
expressed through natural law theory, and I believe that this is a viable
option for Wesleyan ethics. Of course, it seems to me that the empiricist
should not use the concept of natural law as an absolutist would, because
our epistemic limitations prevent us from making such absolute claims. As
I stated earlier, even if I believe that there are moral absolutes, I must admit
that, since I am fallible, my understanding of those absolutes can never
itself be absolute. Natural law can still be seen as an objective reality, but
epistemic humility demands that we see the perception of natural law as an
ongoing pursuit.

2. Virtue ethics. Second, Wesleyan ethics can be construed as a
type of virtue ethics, and I spoke of this earlier. The Wesleyan emphasis on
perfection in love can be understood through the development of various
virtues, all of which describe different aspects of a person’s overall personality and character. Empirical experience can inform the way we understand the virtues, and it is instrumental in ingraining the virtues into the
psyche. In addition, virtue ethics emphasizes personal discipline and
growth in a way that is very consonant with the Wesleyan understanding
of moral progress and the means of grace.
3. Utilitarianism. Third, I believe that utilitarianism could also be
appropriated for Wesleyan ethics.12 Of course, this would require some
nuance in order for it to be truly Wesleyan. God would be seen as the
Summum Bonum, as he is in the thought of Augustine, Aquinas, and others.13 There would also need to be distinctions between various kinds of
12For example, see Wesley, Sermon 100, “On Pleasing All Men,” Works,
3:415-26, Jackson edition, 7:139-46.
13St. Augustine, On the Nature of Good; St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologica, §II.II.26.2.1-3 (New York, Benziger Brothers, 1948), 1289-91.
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pleasure, similar to the categories of higher and lower pleasures spoken of
by Frances Hutcheson and John Stuart Mill.14 The danger of utilitarianism
is that it can be narrowly defined in an attempt to justify selfish egoism.
However, appropriating utilitarianism would require us to think about the
way that piety affects moral motive. For instance, is it more moral to love
others solely for their own sake or to love them primarily (if not solely) for
God’s sake? Utilitarianism would likewise require us to think about the
proper role of self-love, avoiding the two extremes of either supposing that
it can be transcended or ignoring it altogether.

It may reasonably be objected that embracing empiricism may lead to
what some would regard as its excesses. There is always this possibility,
but I do not believe that this would pose a significant threat. For example,
embracing empiricism does not require us to entertain any form of
Pelagianism, as Locke appears to have done.15 What we now know about
our evolutionary dispositions makes it absurd to suggest that any human
being can be born in a state of moral neutrality, without any selfish inclinations whatsoever. Consequently, accepting empiricism does not require
us to entertain such notions.
Empiricism also does not obligate us to give up metaphysics and
become scientific naturalists like the logical positivists. Recognizing our
epistemic limits does not force us to conclude that reality does not extend
beyond those limits. We are not required to say, “If I can’t experience it
empirically, then it must not exist.” Furthermore, empiricism does not preclude divine revelation. What it does require is that we recognize with
Aquinas that all of our concepts are formed empirically, so we can only
understand God through the use of analogy. God’s existence exceeds our
epistemic limits, so any perception we have of God is interpreted through
the lens of empirical experience.
Finally, embracing empiricism does not necessarily lead to the emotivist view of ethics like that proposed by Ayer.16 The fact that we cannot

14John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (New York: Bantam, 1993), 144-50;
Frances Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy (London: Continuum, 2006).
Also, see Mark Strasser, “Hutcheson on the Higher and Lower Pleasures,” Journal
of the History of Philosophy 25 (1987): 517-31.
15Locke, §§ 1.2.3-4, 1:66-9.
16Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1952),
102-14.
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speak of ethics in absolute terms does not force us to accept utter moral relativism. We can still recognize objectivity and normativity in ethics as long
as we do not ignore the subjective element of ethics. Empirical ethics rests
on the hope of moral progress, attained as we learn from our experiences
and then apply that wisdom to our future moral deliberations.
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